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EMINENT DOMAIN USED TO ACQUIRE
GEOLOGICAL SUBSTRATA
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles
24 Ill. 2d 520, 182 N.E.2d 169 (1962)
Plaintiff natural gas company wanted to utilize 5,000 acres of a 23,000-
acre, dome-like structure in a pilot or test operation for the storage of natural
gas. There was no assurance that the project would be successful. The
stratum in which the gas was to be stored was the St. Peter Sandstone, a
geological formation uniquely suited to gas storage but without other com-
mercial value. The surface of the landowner's property was used for farm-
ing and was improved with the usual farm buildings. After obtaining rights
to an easement in most of the 5,000 acres, the gas company still could not
come to terms with the owners of the 160-acre farm in question.' Although
they were not storing gas or attempting such an operation, defendants
valued the property as if it could be used as a successfully operating gas
storage field, even in the absence of public involvement. The company's
final offer of $45 per acre was rejected by the landowners. Suit was instituted
by the company to condemn the geological stratum under defendants' prop-
erty and to determine its value. One estimate of the farm's worth as a gas
storage field was $413,616, a figure based on predicted future net revenue
discounted to a present-day value. This figure was excluded from evidence.
Another estimate, also excluded from evidence, was that the present value of
the land was $250,000 to $300,000, based on its "highest and best" use as a
gas storage field, but it would only be worth from $50,000 to $100,000 after
condemnation by the company. There was testimony that similar land in the
area was sold during the years 1959, 1960 and 1961 at prices ranging from
$500 to $600 per acre and that some of these sales were made after the
owners were aware of the gas storage possibilities. The court fixed the value
of defendants' land in fee at $500 per acre. A verdict was directed for the
company, and damages to the defendants' fee were determined to be $25
per acre, a total recovery of $4,000. The case is one of first impression in
this country.2
The fifth and fourteenth amendments protect citizens of the states and
of the United States from the seizure of private property for public use
without just compensation. 3 The states have adopted similar provisions in
their constitutions. 4 The constitution of Illinois provides in article II, sec-
I The company was acting under the authority of a statute which sanctioned the
condemnation and acquisition of property more than SuO feet below the surface for gas
storage purposes. It had been granted exclusive condemnation rights by the Illinois
Commerce Commission. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 104, §§ 104, 105 (1959); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.
111-2/3, §§ 50, 56 (1959).
2 Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles, 24 Ill. 2d 520, 182 N.E.2d 169 (1962).
3 U.S. Const. amend. V, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City
of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
4 18 Am. Jur. Eminent Domain § 128 (1938).
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tion 13 that: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation." An Illinois statute contains a similar provision. 5
Even in the absence of a constitutional provision, the right of eminent domain
is inherent in all sovereign states6 and, by analogy, in the several states of
the Union.7 Difficulty arises when the meaning of "just compensation" must
be applied to the concrete facts of a particular case. Just compensation is
generally held to be the market value of the land, i.e., the price agreed upon
at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser willing
to buy.8 The measure of compensation is the owner's loss and not the taker's
gain.9 The fact that the land, when combined with other parcels, is worth
many times the present value should not be considered by the court in fixing
damages unless the land can be utilized for the purpose sought, absent public
involvement. 10 However, when competing interests are vying for the land
taken, unless their actions are motivated by the forthcoming condemnation,
that factor must be considered by the court. In Olson v. United States,"
private enterprises were competing for flowage rights to Olson's land, but
such evidence was excluded on the ground that the competition was moti-
vated by the government's contemplated condemnation. The possibility of
use for private purposes must be immediate and not remote or speculative.12
Predicted future profits from a business are considered too remote or con-
tingent to be taken into account when fixing damages.' 3
Condemnation of a geological formation is unusual, but no special
reasons appear for treating such a case differently from other cases of con-
demnation. There are cases where the property in question was exceptionally
adapted to a particular use, but combination with other tracts was not
necessary. In Mississippi & R.R. Boom Co. v. Patterson,'4 it was held that
a property owner's islands could be valued as a log boom because of their
unique adaptability and possible demand for such use. All that was required
to form a boom a mile in length was to connect the islands, a relatively simple
operation. Cases such as this are the exception to the general rule of valua-
tion, the assumption being that the buyer wants to put the property to the
use that the seller could make of it.' 5 In the instant case, however, defend-
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 47, § I (Supp. 1961).
6 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
7 Jones v. North Georgia Elec. Co., 125 Ga. 618, 54 S.E. 85 (1906).
8 Sharpe v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 (1903); City of Chicago v. Farwell, 286
Ill. 415, 121 N.E. 795 (1918).
9 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); City of Chicago v. Provus, 415 II1.
618, 114 N.E.2d 793 (1953).
10 City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57 (1915).
11 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
12 Mississippi & R.R. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
13 Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v. Darrow, 12 DlI. 2d 365, 146 N.E.2d 1 (1957).
1- 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
15 Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 Mass.
189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956), holding that the girl scout camp in question was to be
valued on the basis of its use as a campsite, while the condemnor sought a strip across
the land for highway purposes.
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ants were not operating a gas storage field. There is no indication that, in
the absence of public involvement, the defendant could sell the property to a
private person for use as a gas storage field. It appears that the owners in
the instant case were attempting to profit by the condemnation proceeding at
the expense of the public.16 Compensation under eminent domain is not oc-
casion for excessive enrichment. 17
Defendants' best argument, admittedly a tenuous one, was not brought
out in the opinion. Prior to trial, the gas company, as a willing buyer, had
offered the owners $45 per acre for the easement-presumably the highest
market rate apart from condemnation-but this offer was not even discussed
by the court. Defendants would have received $3200 more than the court's
award had they accepted plaintiff's final offer. If the market value at the
time of the trial for the highest and best use, disregarding public involve-
ment, is actually the measure of compensation as is often stated by the
courts, then such an inflated value should not be rejected.' 8 Where the public
has committed itself to a project, private speculators may hike offers to
landowners and land values may rise. It seems clear that such rises in value
immediately prior to the trial are motivated by public involvement, yet the
market value here is clearly one apart from the condemnor's market. 19 As a
result, some jurisdictions reject market value at the time of the taking as the
measure of compensation and use market value at an earlier date in this
kind of situation.2 0
To the extent that the company pares expenses by being able to store
gas in the summer, such savings should be passed along to the public-the
project having been made possible by public sanction. Of course, a fair re-
turn should be given to stimulate such an enterprise and cover company ex-
penses, but any gains in excess of that should be returned to the public,
and not given to the landowner.
The final figure of $4000 awarded by the court appears to have been a
generous one. The property taken was 1600 feet below the surface of the
ground, while the surface itself was left untouched. Defendants could con-
tinue farming and conducting their usual activities on the land without
hindrance from the gas storage. The only possible use which could be made
of the stratum, a salt-water-filled sandstone, was foreclosed to the defend-
ants because plaintiff had already obtained the rights to the surrounding
strata, such acquisition having been made solely because of public involve-
ment. An award of nominal damages, even below the figure of $4,000, would
not have been patently unjust.
16 "Methods of Establishing 'Just Compensation' in Eminent Domain Proceedings
in Illinois: A Symposium," 1957 Ill. L.F. 289.
17 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1896).
18 City of New York v. Sage, supra note 10; City of Chicago v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y, 8 Ill. 2d 341, 134 N.E.2d 296 (1956).
9 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 83 (2d ed. 1953).
20 Benton v. Brookline, 151 Mass. 250, 23 N.E. 846 (1890).
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